Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the factors that have been effective in rising of Iran as a regional power after 1979 Islamic Revolution. For this aim, the study begins with the examination of the background of Iran’s rich state culture and history. Then, the main factors of this paper have been investigated such as the theocratic structure of Iran, the compliance of this structure to the developments and transitionsin the Middle East, the relations of Iran with Russia and the USA, the regional policies run by Iran-Russia duet, and the clashing and intersecting interests of Iran and Russia. As a result, it has been concluded that the main reason for rising of Iran as a regional power is its theocratic structure and mutual policies followed with Russia rather than its richstate culture and history. It is estimated that the study may contribute to the related literature.

Keywords: Regional Power, Iran, Theocratic, Middle East, Sectarianism.

Introduction

The concept of power, which is basically divided into two general categories as "soft power" and "hard power", can be defined as the effect of a state on another state or group of states, as well as on a concrete region or throughout the world geography. When it comes to the power of a country, many factors such as its population, geographical location, natural resources, economy, technology, scientific power, army, beliefs and values, historical heritage and culture come to mind. Every state naturally wants to be strong and increase its influence both regionally and globally. When we classify states in terms of power categories, we see a five-tier pyramid. At the top of this pyramid are the superpowers that establish global hegemony, the great powers that can establish global dominance in certain areas below them, the regional powers that provide regional dominance in the third place, the sub-regional powers that can have limited regional influence in the fourth place, and the sub-regional powers that can have a limited regional influence in the fourth place, and at the bottom in foreign policy weak forces that are dependent.

Within the scope of this pyramid, the United States of America (USA) is considered a superpower, the Russian Federation (RF) is considered a great power, and Iran is considered a regional power. Regional powers are powers whose capabilities are only effective for a certain region and cannot participate in many global developments. In terms of its strategic geographical location, natural resources, young and growing population, and minimum power, Iran is defined as a regional power in the political literature.  Iran is also considered a regional power in the classification of Barry Buzan, the author of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). In addition, Iran is also reviewed as a regional power in the researches of Josef Westermayr, Barış Doster, Abdullah Yeğin, Talha Köse, Karami Jahangir and others. As a matter of fact, Iran is considered a regional power by the Shah period and in the first ten years after the Islamic revolution. However, after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran started to carry out an active foreign policy on a regional scale and to increase its influence on the Muslim states around it after the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1979-1986). “With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Iran’s sphere of influence expanded; this process was further accelerated by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, effectively acquiring a lasting character.” In parallel with all these developments, it can be said that the process of Iran's transformation into a regional power started in the early 1990s.

All states, undoubtedly, desire to reach regional power or world power with the contribution of the energy and culture they receive from history. Iran was also influenced by its history and culture during this process. When the Safavid period (1501-1736) is compared with today's theocratic republic, these effects are seen more clearly. Iran's current political structure and sectarian policy are very similar to the political-ideological structure and domestic and foreign policies of the Safavid Empire. It seems that Iranian ideologues did not choose the most powerful period in its history by chance when creating the theocratic regime.

In this study, the factors of "history and culture" were evaluated from a different perspective, contrary to the predominant thoughts in academic circles; because as the main factors of Iran's transformation into a regional power after the 1979 Islamic revolution; the theocratic structure of the country, the suitability of this structure for the changes and developments in the Middle East, Iran's relations with Russia and the USA, the mistakes made by the USA in the Post-Soviet period and in the Middle East, the regional policies carried out by the Iran-Russia duo and the conflicting and intersecting interests of these two states are examined in detail. Within the scope of the study, a comparison of the Middle East policies of the USA and the Russian Federation was also made, with the idea that it will contribute to a better understanding of the process of Iran's transformation into a regional power.

It is considered that this qualitative study, which is carried out by making use of the first and, when appropriate, secondary source data, will enable a better understanding of the dynamics of the Middle East centered on Iran and Russia and will contribute to the relevant literature.

1. History and Culture Factor

Some researchers show that the Iranian/Persian State is based on an old and rich culture and state tradition as one of the main factors of the effective foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (OIC). In order to understand to what extent this claim is realistic, it is useful to take a brief look at the history of Iran chronologically. To summarize, the Arabs destroyed the Sassanid Empire in the 7th century and added its lands to the Caliphate. From the 10th century onwards, strong states began to be established one after the other by the Turkish tribes on Iranian lands. The Ghaznavids, Seljuks and Atabeys, who ruled between 1040-1225, are among these states. After the Mongol-Tatar invasion (1220-1256), which brought the end of the Atabeys State, the Ilkhanate State was established in the region. The second invasion of Iran was carried out by Timur in the 1400s. In the following time, a 200 year Safavid period was experienced from 1501 to 1709 in Iran, where the Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu ruled. After the Safavid period, in the two-century period between 1722 and 1925, the Afshar and Qajar dynasties, which were Turkish tribes, dominated Iran. After 1925, the Pahlavi Dynasty of Persian origin came to power and in 1935, Reza Shah changed the name of the state from 'Persia' to 'Iran', which is actually a geographical term.

As can be inferred from the chronological summary above, from the Arab conquest of the Sasanian Empire in the 7th century to the rise of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925—that is, from the last Persian monarchy of the Sasanians to the Pahlavi rule—approximately 1,300 years elapsed, during which numerous Turkic dynasties established states within the Iranian geographical space. In this respect, it is considered that it is not correct to present Iranian civilization and state tradition as a phenomenon consisting only of Persian civilization and state tradition. Another point that draws attention in this long period is that there was no long-term stability in the region except for the 200 year powerful Safavid Empire period, which lasted from the collapse of the Sassanid Empire to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Dynasties have followed each other for centuries in the Iranian geography; different power relations were established through marriage and inheritance ties; the structures of these powers, and especially their interests, have changed frequently; As a result, each dynasty that came to power pursued different policies from the previous one, both militarily and politically. In short, after the 7th century, no state in Iran, except the Safavids, could be a long-term actor and could not provide continuous stability. No matter how powerful the Mongol-Tatars and Timurids were, who occupied the region for a while, the power they established in the region was short-lived.

It can be said that the argument that today's Iran has a rich cultural heritage is quite ambitious. Because the state history of the period after Islam was not a period in which the Sassanid state heritage and tradition were preserved and transferred to the future as a continuation of each other. After the adoption of Islam, there was almost no trace of the Sassanid state experience and traditions of the previous period; in addition, the cultural examples and religious monuments of Zoroastrianism were completely destroyed by the Arabs. Therefore, the claim that "Iran/Persia has a very old history and a rich tradition, and this history, culture and state tradition is the main source of successful foreign policy" is far from being a solid claim.

On the other hand, the thesis that stability and development in the Iranian geography disappeared with the Sassanids, that is, with the Persian domination, and reappeared with the Persians coming to power in the 20th century is also weak. For example, the 200 year old Safavid period founded by the Turkmen tribes is the most powerful period of the Iranian geography; On the contrary, the Pahlavi period of Persian origin was a weak period in which stability disappeared in Iran and foreign capital and foreign powers played horses; In many cases, the state has even been far from protecting its independence. Therefore, the claim that the rich tradition of statism and culture played an important role in Iran's transformation into a regional power since the end of the 20th century is weak to say the least. Therefore, it is necessary to look for other factors for how Iran was able to turn into a regional power in a short time after the Islamic revolution in 1979.

2. Constitution, Foreign Policy and Sectarianism

Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran (OIC) has pursued a foreign policy that is substantially different from the basic principles declared in its constitution. For example, in the preamble of the constitution, it is emphasized that the Iranian revolution is a movement that will establish the victory of the weak over the strong. Again, in the preamble of the constitution, it is stated that the duty of the Iranian army and the guardians of the Islamic revolution is not only to protect geographical borders; It is underlined that it is jihad, war and struggle for the expansion of Allah's law and sovereignty in the world. In the 16th paragraph of the third article of the Constitution, in support of these views; "Foreign policy; Adherence to Islamic standards and commitments of brotherhood with all Muslims and to organize all the mustaz'afs of the world on the foundations of protection" is stated as a strategic goal.  In addition to these principles, based on the statement embodied in the Qur’an, Surah Al-Anbiya, verse 92 — “Indeed, this community of yours is one community, and I am your Lord. So worship Me.” — Article 11 of the Constitution has been formulated as follows: “Iran must ground its general foreign policy on the foundation of fostering friendship and unity among Muslim nations, and must constantly strive to achieve solidarity within the Islamic world in political, cultural, and economic domains.”

From these expressions in the Constitution, it is clear that Iran aims to create a basis to ensure the survival and continuity of the Islamic revolution at home and abroad; It is understood that it aims to fight against oppressive governments that have fallen into trouble on a global scale by developing international relations with oppressed people's movements, especially in other Islamic countries. On the other hand, immediately after the revolution, in 1980, an international conference was held in Tehran on behalf of the Islamic Freedom Movements for the same purpose and the High Coordination Council of Islamic Revolutions in Foreign Countries was established. In addition, organizations such as the Standing Committee for Hajj Services, the International Congress of Friday Imams, and the International Islamic Propaganda Bureau have also started to operate.

On the other hand, there is a significant incompatibility between the principles enshrined in the OIC Constitution and the organizations formed in accordance with these principles and Iran's foreign policy or practices. For the aforementioned organizations were expected to at least help the formation of Islamic unity and ensure Iran's role as a leading state. However, this was not the case. Likewise, it is possible to see a similar incompatibility in Iran's foreign policy practices towards Muslim countries. For example, immediately after the 1979 Revolution, the OIC abandoned the slogan 'Neither East nor West, only Islam!' and went to war with its neighbor Muslim Iraq. In addition, it has started to take steps in line with its goal of becoming a regional power. Within this framework, in the early 1980s, Iran attempted to organize military coups in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), orchestrated anti-government activities in Kuwait, advanced its process of rising as a regional power, and deployed the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) to Lebanon. Due to these activities and interference in the internal affairs of some other countries in the region; With Lebanon in 1984; With Egypt in 1987; In 1988, diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were severed. By the end of the 1980s, important problems began to arise between the Arab states and Iran, except for Syria and Libya; After the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, Iran-Afghanistan relations entered an environment of crisis.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Iran began to pursue an aggressive policy against Muslim countries that gained independence after the Soviet Union and supported Islamic fundamentalism against the governments in these states. This situation created fundamental disturbances in the Central Asian states and these countries began to make harsh accusations against the theocratic administration in Tehran. For example, Uzbekistan President İslam Kerimov accused Iran of stirring up Tajikistan and Central Asia in general, saying that the region was being turned into a civil war zone by Islamist groups, and said, "No matter who it comes from, the politicization of Islam will be responded to". On the other hand, Iran did not support the freedom struggle of the Muslims of Chechnya, again contrary to its own constitution and due to its interests that overlapped with the Russian Federation. Moreover, Iran has formed the South-North axis by taking Russia and Yerevan with it against the East-West axis created by Ankara and Washington by including Baku and Tbilisi; in parallel with the tension between these two axes, it has tried to provide all kinds of support to Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

In short, until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, rather than pursuing the formation of an Islamic Union, Iran frequently adopted a foreign policy contrary to its Constitution in order to exert influence over neighboring Muslim states and bring theocratic regimes to power in these countries. In addition, as in the case of Armenia, it did not hesitate to establish alliances with non-Muslim states against Muslim states in order to realize its own national interests. However, during this period, Iran could not create the conditions for the establishment of an Islamic regime similar to itself in any state in the former Soviet geography or in the Middle East; on the contrary, it has fallen into a situation of isolation from the Muslim world. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran was convinced that a new era had begun in the region and decided to transform the claim of the leader of the Muslim world into the claim of "the leader of the Shiites". The Sunni-Shiite divide that emerged in the Middle East became more evident especially after the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. In a sense, Iran tried to keep the Muslim states around it under pressure by modernizing the historical Safavid model and applying it to the contemporary period and turning the Shiite sect into a state ideology, dividing the Muslim world on the basis of sect and becoming an important actor in the Middle East by claiming that it was the leader of the Shiites. Although the center of Shiism is the cities of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq, Iran has taken on the role of the patron of this sect. According to Kayhan Mutlu et al., "With these efforts, Iran has politicized Shiism, which is a form of belief and stays away from politics, and made it one of Iran's foreign policy tools. After the invasion of Iraq, Iran's patronage of Iraqi Shiites caused the focus of Shiism to shift to Iran. When Shiism is mentioned in the world, Iran has started to come to mind." In fact, Iran left the Muslim states that gained their independence after the Soviet Union during this period when Vladimir Putin was in power to Russia, which fully returned to the Eurasianist policy; in this way, it was able to be more effective by turning its power and attention to the Middle East. With the onset of the “Arab Spring”, this policy became more explicit and pronounced, as Iran perceived the process as an Islamic awakening and interpreted and presented it, much like the 1979 Iranian Revolution, as a movement opposed to the United States and the West. On the other hand, it welcomed the events in Iran, Egypt and Tunisia; however, after the events spread to Syria, it started to pursue a real politics and took measures to limit freedom movements against the danger that similar separatist movements could be adopted by its own opposition.

One of the main reasons why Iran focuses so much on the Shiite sect is that Shiism brought together the peoples living in the Iranian geography during the 200 year Safavid period and transformed them into a political and ideological power. It should not be forgotten that this "safe weapon" prevented the formation of a national identity consciousness in the 30 million Azeri Turkish community living within the borders of Iran and united all ethnic groups around a concrete sectarian identity under the name of "One Iranian People" (similar to the Soviet people) and provided the Iranian state with a guarantee of existence. In other words, the Shiite sect has held the mosaic of Iran with different identities together like a cement. Relying on this ideological power it derives from domestic politics and taking advantage of the favorable international situation in the world and its immediate surroundings, Iran has achieved the opportunity to control a wide corridor between Tehran and the Mediterranean by realizing a dream that has perhaps never been realized in its history. Almost the entire Arab world, especially Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia, is concerned about this situation that has developed in favor of Iran.

As of today, Iran is trying to establish a "Shiite Crescent" on the Iraq-Syria-Lebanon axis with the close support of Hezbollah as a result of the recent conflicts and crises in the Middle East, and it is very close to achieving its goal. Henry Kissinger has indicated that, in the new Middle East, Iran could evolve into an empire, stating: “If the territories held by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) come under Iranian control, a crescent representing the emergence of Iran’s radical empire will extend from Tehran to Beirut as a consequence of these developments.” Beyond this, Iran wants to realize these plans by becoming an influential power in the economic life of the region with the construction of new energy transportation lines. The reason that frightened the Gulf countries and led them to cooperate with Israel by bringing them together was Iran's plan to create a "Shiite Crescent" in both ideological, political-military and economic fields.

3. The Russian Factor in Iran's Foreign Policy

Russia occupies a special place in the foreign policy of the IC. The transformation of this special situation into an effective cooperation in the Middle East policies of both countries started with the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov, a Middle East expert, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1993. The fact that Primakov became a minister was an indication of the loss of the "Euro-Atlanticists" in Russia and the victory of the "Eurasianists". After this, Iran gained an important place in the foreign policy of Russia, which turned its face to Eurasia, and the relations between the two countries developed at a remarkable level. When Primakov took office, he first criticized Russia's passive attitude towards the USA and its almost unconditional support for US policies, emphasizing that Russia had special geopolitical advantages and interests, and drew attention to the importance of expanding Russia's influence in the Islamic world and developing relations with the Central Asian and Caucasian Republics. During Primakov's period, Russia's foreign policy focused on combating three existing negative situations. The foremost challenge to be addressed is Russia’s defeat in the Cold War, its status as a vanquished state, and its lack of recognition as a European nation. The second is the establishment of a unipolar world order and the interests of all countries have to adapt to the interests of one great state, namely the USA. The third is that the Russian economy plays the role of a raw material producer rather than a technology in the world economic system.

When we look at the impact of the international environment on Iran-Russia relations in the post-Primakov period, we see that in the first decade of its independence, even in the early periods of the practical application of "Eurasianism", which Primakov attaches importance to, Iran was seen as a danger for Russia. With Putin's coming to power, the idea that Iran is a threat has disappeared and Iran has become a country that creates special opportunities for Russia's foreign policy. With a different approach, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Russia appeared close to the USA due to the conjuncture and encouraged the USA to enter the Afghanistan quagmire. Likewise, in a short period of time after September 11, it approached Iran coldly. However, the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 frightened Russia and prompted it to establish warmer relations with Iran. After this date, Russia started to see Iran as one of the important states of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia again. The serious reflections of radical changes in Russia's policy towards the Western world were manifested in the National Security Measures, Foreign Policy Measures and Military Doctrine documents prepared by the Putin administration at the beginning of 2000. As can be understood from the principles of foreign policy doctrine, Putin's Russia began to see itself as a state with great goals and opportunities in these documents and did not want to lose the opportunities provided by its cooperation with Iran in the international game. Answering the question "What danger could come to Russia from a nuclear-armed Iran?", a senior security official of Russia said: "The danger to Russia can only come from an Iran that is a friend of the United States." In the Middle East, the OIC and the Russian Federation, pursuing shared objectives, seek to exert control over the United States in the region through this bilateral cooperation. On the one hand, the trade partnership between the two countries; on the other hand, Russia's approach to the Islamic world, especially the Persian Gulf, and Russia's view of Iran as a state that spreads its influence in the region contribute to this rapprochement. On the other hand, for Russia, Iran also plays the role of Turkey's geopolitical rival.

In fact, as stated above, the Russia-Armenia-Iran union emerged as a reaction to the Turkey-US-Azerbaijan union. According to Iran, the positive relations it has established with Russia provide the opportunity to create a balance against the West, especially the preventive policies of regional countries such as Turkey and Pakistan. Russia's relations with Iran help strengthen its influence in its immediate surroundings, especially in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.

Russia is sensitive to strong influences from the south in Central Asia, the Caspian Basin and the Caucasus, so it approaches the events in these regions carefully. In Russia's foreign policy goals; Keeping the country's borders with neighboring countries under control, eliminating tensions in the regions close to the borders without causing a hot conflict, and preventing possible problems in advance are considered as one of the main duties. Iran is the only country that is adjacent to Russia through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus, and this strategic position allows Iran to occupy an important place in Russian foreign policy. Iran and Russia are also the two countries that provide access to the open seas to the countries bordering the Caspian Sea, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In addition to these geographical advantages, Iran also has historical and cultural ties with Central Asian and Caucasian countries. Although these advantages initially led Russia to approach Iran’s regional activities with caution, the Tajikistan crisis demonstrated the significance of regional cooperation between the two states.  In this context, Iran’s perspective on Russia over the past two decades has been strategic in scope, and Tehran has attached great importance to the bilateral relationship. The key factors shaping the content and character of Iranian and Russian foreign policies can be summarized as follows:

· Cooperate in preventing Western powers, particularly the United States, from exerting influence in the region and in determining the new legal regime of the Caspian Sea.

· Assess opportunities to cooperate with Iran in safeguarding Russia’s interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

· Collaborate in realizing the North-South corridor, which provides Russia access to the Persian Gulf and, through it, to the Indian subcontinent.

· Support Iran’s acquisition of nuclear energy technology.

· Utilize Iran as a bargaining tool in diplomatic relations with Western countries.

· Cooperate with Iran in ways that enhance Russia’s influence in the Middle East and weaken the United States’ position in the region.

Undoubtedly, Russia’s cooperation with Iran in the field of nuclear energy has not only provided Iran with extensive economic benefits but also helped strengthen its position within the international system.

On the other hand, Russia’s regional interests can be outlined under the following headings:

· Facilitate rapprochement between Iran and Israel.

· Establish a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and Syria.

· Form an Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon bloc in the Middle East, and include the newly established Kurdish state within this bloc to shift the regional balance of power in Russia’s favor.

· Weaken the U.S. coalition with the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain).

The change in Russia's foreign policy line has also affected Iran's relationship with the United States. Namely, in September 2007, when it was revealed in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reports of the US intelligence units that there was no possibility of any military conflict with Iran, the George W. Bush administration began to attach importance to diplomatic pressures against Iran. During this period, Russia pursued a policy in favor of Iran; Diplomatic pressures on Iran gradually weakened and this situation was seen as a valuable opportunity for Iran. In this context, Tehran's request from Russia in order to neutralize the sanctions imposed on it by the West; It can be said that Moscow is taking advantage of Iran in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, which are its spiritual spheres of influence, in order to put pressure on the West. It seems that Russia has played a major role in Iran's effective foreign policy in the last 20 years and its transformation into a serious actor in the Middle East. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that Iran would not be able to pursue effective policies in the Middle East without Russia's support. The same considerations apply to Russia. In other words, it could not be expected that Russia would return to the Middle East by effectively implementing its Eurasian policies without Iran and consolidate its influence in the region in a short period of time.

4. Shifting Power Dynamics in the Post-Soviet Region and the Middle East

Since 1991, the Caspian Basin has occupied a significant place in the United States’ policy toward Russia. By seeking to bring this basin under its control, the United States aimed, on the one hand, to ensure the transportation of the region’s rich hydrocarbon resources to global markets and to secure Europe’s energy supply; and on the other hand, to position itself between Russia and Iran in order to open the route to Central Asia. The Silk Road Strategy carried out in the 1990s, major transportation projects, and the functioning of GUAM-DECO (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development), which was established by the coming together of Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldavia, have been important steps taken towards the implementation of this policy.

At the same time, the USA wanted the Muslim states that gained their independence after the Soviet Union to have a secular structure in order to prevent the ideological expansion of Iran on the one hand and to gain new allies for Israel, which was surrounded by Muslim Arab states, on the other hand. Tel-Aviv, in line with these policies of the USA, on the one hand, strives to establish relations with newly independent Muslim states; on the other hand, it tried to reduce the pressures of the Islamic world on itself. Likewise, Israel's view of Muslim states that gained their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union was shaped by their secular structure rather than whether they were democratic or not.

 

William J. Clinton from the period From The USA Russia in politics some Inconsistencies and Hesitations Revealed Dating Started. The USA sometimes supported color revolutions in the former Soviet geography; sometimes, on the contrary, it has given importance to stability. The color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan frightened the regimes in the region and these states first started to act cautiously in their relations with the USA, and then gradually moved away from the USA. Naturally, in almost all of these countries, the search for democracy has been weakened and in some places, opposition parties, which are the cornerstones of democracy, have been completely excluded from the political scene by the current authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the USA was also afraid of the increase of Turkey's power in a large geography, that is, in Central Asia, and as a natural consequence of this, it believed that the further shrinkage of Russia after 1995 and the emergence of new independent states would not serve the interests of the USA.

 

However, the first thing to do in order for the idea of democracy to spread is to create a suitable environment for democratic development and the elimination of possible threats from Russia. In this context, it would not be wrong to evaluate that it would be a better step towards supporting democratic development for the USA to reduce its influence and power in Russia's immediate surroundings instead of supporting color revolutions. Likewise, it is thought that it may be a more appropriate policy for the USA to disable Russia by cooperating with the existing regimes both in the land geography and the Caspian Sea Basin, as well as in the former socialist republics of Eastern Europe, in terms of regional security and democratic development. As a result of the hesitations and inconsistencies in the US policies towards the region, Russia regained its power in the former Soviet geography; The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) restored its relations with its successor countries. This means that Russia will determine the pace of development of democracy in the countries of the region in the coming time. However, it would be a dream to expect the former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic countries, which have severe economic and social problems, to reach even Russia's standards in terms of the quality of democracy.

 

In addition to these evaluations, it is a fact that the USA, which did not want Russia, which has a great nuclear power, to be divided, could not prevent Russia from reappearing as a serious power in the early 2000s. As a manifestation of this reality, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and the USA remained a spectator to this situation. Similar developments took place in Crimea in 2014 and then in the east of Ukraine. In 2012, as George Friedman writes in his book The Next Decade, Russia invaded eastern Ukraine and increased the distance between Kazakhstan and Ukraine from 380 kilometers, that is, Russia's gateway to the Caucasus, to approximately 700 kilometers. According to Anastasiya Ivanovna and Aleksandra Musatkina, "For the first time after the Second World War, a European state occupied the territory of another European state." The USA remained inactive in the face of all these developments; When the mistakes made in the 1990s and missed opportunities were added to this, the Russian Federation began to threaten the White House and the West. Moreover, in 2014, shortly after the events in Ukraine, Russia went beyond the former Soviet borders for the first time and started military operations in Syria and managed to become an effective actor in the region in a very short time.

 

In fact, it would not be wrong to say that the USA constantly makes mistakes not only in the former Soviet geography but also in the Middle East. For example, it is becoming better understood day by day that the US entered Iraq in 2003 was a serious mistake. Because the collapse of the economic, political, ethnic, religious and social structure of this country has benefited Iran and Tehran's doors to the Middle East have been opened. After the withdrawal of the USA, Iran almost took the Baghdad administration under its control and doubled its power to dominate the region, and from there it turned to Syria and Lebanon. In fact, it would not be wrong to say that the USA constantly makes mistakes not only in the former Soviet geography but also in the Middle East. For example, it is becoming better understood day by day that the US entered Iraq in 2003 was a serious mistake. Because the collapse of the economic, political, ethnic, religious and social structure of this country has benefited Iran and Tehran's doors to the Middle East have been opened. After the withdrawal of the USA, Iran almost took the Baghdad administration under its control and doubled its power to dominate the region, and from there it turned to Syria and Lebanon.

 

In other words, the mistakes of the USA in the post-Soviet space resulted in the strengthening of Russia and created an environment for the further acceleration of Iran-Russia relations, and then the repetition of the same process in the Middle East strengthened Iran's position and created a new area for Iran-Russia cooperation. Considering the claim that the Arab Spring was prepared in a political kitchen led by the United States to reshape the Middle East in the post-Soviet space, it is really difficult to make a logical explanation why these events did not affect the monarchies in the region, but only brought about changes in the republics. Because it can be said that Saudi Arabia and its neighboring sheikhdoms and city-states were able to keep their citizens away from the influence of the Arab Spring with "rentier state" practices, that is, individual rights and freedoms were taken hostage with the rent provided by the state. However, it is not credible to claim that democracy makes a choice between republics and monarchies in a place where there are no fundamental rights and freedoms. It is impossible to find such an example in history.

 

If we assume that democracy is a contagious "virus" suitable for transmission, the "virus" of democracy will infect every society, regardless of whether it is a republic or a monarchy. To claim otherwise is as inconsistent as to claim that the flu virus chooses between people, that is, it discriminates between men and women. Democratic values and human rights include freedom and fundamental rights before social welfare, and they want to penetrate every society without them and embrace people. It is not possible for these values to be removed, forgotten or suffocated with social welfare. In the end, it would not be wrong to say that the Arab Spring did not serve the expected purpose, on the contrary, Russia and Iran gained power in the Middle East, but the USA suffered a more serious loss of power in the Middle East with the Arab Spring.

 

On the other hand, thoughts, plans and maps about the reshaping of the Middle East and the establishment of new states here began to spread in the media as early as the 1980s. What is happening in the Middle East today contains features that are in line with what has been written. When we take a brief look at these plans in chronological order, we come across the claim of Israeli journalist Oded Yinon as early as 1982 that there would be a new geopolitical formation in the Middle East and that the Arab states would collapse." This plan, known as the "Yinon Plan"; He proposed that Iraq, Syria and Lebanon be divided into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish regions. This plan also mentioned the Turkey-Iran-Pakistan line. In 1997, the "Yinon Plan" was further developed in the research published by American writers Dj. Kemp and R. Kharkavi. After a while, American General Wesley Clark, one of the former commanders of NATO, in his book Winning ModernWars, Iraq, Iran, He claimed that Syria, Libya and Somalia would disintegrate. On November 6, 2003, US President George W. Bush put forward the "Greater Middle East Project" and three years later, the Armed Forces Journal published a map prepared by the American National Military Academy. In this map, a share of land was allocated to "Free Kurdistan" from Syria and Iraq, as well as from the east of Turkey and the west of Iran; It was envisaged that the Mediterranean coast of Syria would be given to Lebanon. American Professor Michael Davy modernized this map a little and established a small Alawite state on the Mediterranean coast of Syria; He gave the Golantepes to Israel; In return for Israel's renunciation of East Jerusalem, it established a Palestinian state on Jordanian land; he divided Lebanon into Shiite and Christian-Maronite regions. Following this plan, a new project emerged. Accordingly, former American diplomat Dennis Ross, historian David Fromkin, and political scientists Kenneth Pollak and Daniel Byman proposed the partition of Saudi Arabia and Egypt along the Nile River and the accession of Kuwait and Qatar to the United Arab Emirates. In this context, in 2006, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced her plan for changes in the Middle East to the public.

 

Until the Arab Spring, such surveys and maps were viewed as geopolitical dreams. But now people can observe and discuss which part of this plan has been realized and which has not. In the face of these writings and official statements, few people now claim that the Arab Spring was caused by the natural desires and wishes of the peoples living in the Middle East. World

the vast majority of the public now thinks that this plan was prepared by the USA and that the Arab Spring is a project used for the implementation of this plan. After the revolutions in Arab countries, terrorist organizations in the region became more active and new aggressive and organized organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) started their terrorist activities. Rightly, many experts consider the emergence of ISIS as the aid project of the Arab Spring. In other words, it is aimed that ISIS deepens the chaos that can be managed in the region in order to reshape the Middle East, thus paving the way for the activities of organizations such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the Popular Protection Units (YPG) aimed at an independent Kurdistan, and ultimately the establishment of these "States of Stateless Armies" can be said. However, the "Arab Spring" wave became ineffective in Turkey with the coup attempt that took place on July 15, 2016. The events of July 15 did not only show Turkey's commitment to democracy; at the same time, it has revealed what the states and organizations in the West are secretly doing. As a result of these developments, the prestige of the USA, which claims to be the defender of democratic values and human rights in the world and has gained this image in a way, has been greatly damaged. Although the USA now has the strongest army in the world, it will not be able to have much influence far from its borders without its soft power, which has been greatly damaged and discredited by the Arab Spring.

 

In addition, undoubtedly, the domestic policy problems of the USA also have an impact on this process. For example, the suspicion of Russia's cyber interference in the US Presidential election process pushes the US President and his policies to a lack of trust in both domestic and foreign public opinion. It is clearly seen that the process will not take place in favor of the USA in the near future; because, on the one hand, the socio-political stability of the USA has disappeared a short time ago, the relations between the USA and the EU have weakened, and with BREXIT (Britain's departure) the idea of joint partnership was damaged; on the other hand, Russia and Iran have become closer to each other. Another negative factor is that neither Turkey nor China are completely on the side of the USA or even the West. Western experts clearly argue that the USA has lost its power in the region after the latest developments in the Middle East. For example, experienced Middle East experts Robert Fisk and Patrick Cockburn argue in their article at the beginning of 2018 that the United States has become completely ineffective in the Middle East, especially with President Donald Trump.

 

The most important reason for Iran's rapid progress and becoming a regional power in the Middle East, which is considered the number one conflict zone in the world today, is actually related to the reasons explained above. Undoubtedly, the most effective of these reasons is Iran's foreign policy practices carried out jointly with Russia after the Cold War. In addition, the hesitant or, more precisely, erroneous foreign policy practices of the USA in this process have been effective in Iran's consolidation of this role more and more.

  

Conclusion

When we look briefly at the history of the 20th century, we see that Iran was occupied several times until 1979, that is, until the Islamic Revolution; It has become a weak state in which stability has disappeared and foreign capital and powers have taken off. Iran's rich hydrocarbon reserves could not provide it with stability and solid economic development; On the contrary, some serious problems have arisen from the abundance of these natural resources. In other words, the Shah's administration in Iran has not been able to make sufficient use of this natural wealth of the country, which has a strategic scale, neither for the development of the economy nor for the realization of political stability and an independent foreign policy.

 

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran started to carry out a regionally active foreign policy and became a regional power in a short time with the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the main source of power of this transformation is not military and economic power, rich statist tradition and culture; the theocratic political structure of the country, the ideological model it followed, and in addition to these, the factors of skillfully benefiting from the changing international environment after the Cold War and conducting a more flexible foreign policy were examined. Iran's theocratic political structure and its current ideology, which is contrary to the system of international relations arising from it, on the one hand, guaranteed its protection from external factors by closing in on it; on the other hand, it has enabled the opening of the doors of neighboring states and new dynamics that can affect those states.

 

Successive events in the region have also had a significant impact on Iran's transformation into a regional power. In this context, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US attack on Afghanistan and then Iraq, the drift of chaos in the Middle East with the "Arab Spring", and the attitudes of the West and Israel in the deepening of sectarian conflicts in the Middle East have come to the fore as factors that increase Iran's power in the region. One of the most important reasons for Iran's increasing influence in the Middle East was that after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran gradually moved away from the policy of "protector of the world's Muslims" and assumed the role of "leader of the Shiites", practically contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.

 

Another important reason has been the Russian factor. After Putin came to power, it is seen that Russia's Iran policy has changed rapidly. During the Putin era, Russia did not serve Iran as a rival in the Caspian Sea basin, Central Asia and the Caucasus; It has started to look at it as a reliable state that creates opportunities and opportunities in this region and in the Middle East and at the same time can put pressure on the West. Thus, while Iran first cooperated with Russia only in Central Asia and the Caspian basin, this cooperation later influenced the Middle East. Iran is trying to both ease the West's pressure on itself by turning Russia's interests in the Middle East into an opportunity. also found the opportunity to pursue a policy of sectarianism. Russia, on the other hand, was definitely not disturbed by Iran's sectarianism in its domestic and foreign policy; it has even sometimes been seen that the Russian media promote this sectarianism using old KGB methods; because the vast majority of Muslims living in Russia (North Caucasians, Tatars, Bashkirs, etc.) and all Central Asian republics are representatives of the Sunni-Hanafi sect. In Azerbaijan alone, about 60% of the population is Shiite. But here, too, Turkish identity has put sectarianism in the background and neutralized it. In other words, Russia is not bothered by Iran's sectarian policy in the Middle East; on the contrary, he was satisfied. It seems that without Russia, it would be very difficult for Iran to turn into a regional power in the Middle East. In return, Russia was able to return to the Middle East and stand against the USA only by taking Iran with it.

 

After 1979, Iran's declaration of the USA as an enemy was beneficial to the Iranian regime in the context of the country and the Islamic world. The US attack on Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s allowed Iran to open its doors to the East and the West. As a result of the USA's inability to use its "hard power" effectively in these regions, its "soft power" has also lost its effect; respect for the USA on a world scale has started to turn into fear and hatred. Subsequently, as a result of the start of the "Arab Spring" and the USA's inability to benefit sufficiently from its "soft power", which it has always used skillfully, the image of the USA in the world was shaken; As a result, while Iran was advancing further in the Middle East, the withdrawal of the USA was inevitable.

 

However, since sectarianism is the basis of Iran's theocratic structure and its domestic and foreign policy, this power cannot be accepted as "soft power". The sectarianism model, which worked in the system of states of the Middle Ages, cannot be considered a reliable model in today's world, nor a reliable ideology for domestic and foreign policy. In the Middle Ages, there was no democracy for societies and political parties, which were the carriers of ideologies, did not operate. Religion was the main source of power that dominated politics. Today, it is impossible to maintain a long-term regional power status anywhere in the world on the basis of the medieval state model. The January 2018 uprisings also showed that IranSince its politics are not based on economic, technological, democratic values and the power of science, the current regime may lose its status as a regional power in a short time if it ignores the needs of the people and continues to spend resources on foreign policy.

  

Summary

This article examines how Iran turned into a regional power inthe Middle East in the post-1990 period. In this study, rather than thenotion of “state with high history and culture accumulation” attributedto Iran as a general opinion, more dynamic and current policy principlesare taken into consideration. These principles are the theocraticstructure of Iran the compatibility of this structure with the changesand developments in the Middle East, Iran’s relations with Russia andthe United States (US), the mistakes the US made in the Middle East inpost-Soviet period, and regional policies carried out jointly by Iran.

 

Some researchers posit that the one of the main factors of theeffective foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IIC) is basedon the old and rich tradition of culture and state. However, it can besaid that this argument is quite ambitious. After the acceptance of Islam,the Sasani state experience of the previous turn, almost no trace of itstraditions, cultural examples and Zoroastrian religious monumentshave been completely destroyed by the Arabs. That is why the statementexpressing that “Iranian/Persian state has a very old history, cultureand a rich state tradition, and this is the main source of successfulforeign politics” is far from being a sound claim. Therefore, it isnecessary to look for other reasons why after a short period after theIslamic revolution of 1979 Iran transformed into a regional power.

 

Iran attaches special importance to Russian Federation (RF) inits foreign policy towards becoming a regional power. The fact thatthis special case turned into an effective cooperation between the twocountries in Middle East policies, starting with the appointment of pro-Eurasianist Primakov as RF Foreign Minister in 1993. Russia, whichsuccumbed to the leadership of the United States in the unipolar worldorder as a loser of post-Cold War era with an economy based on rawmaterial rather than technology began to see Iran as a strategic partner,especially in energy politics. Iran is the only neighboring country toRussia through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus, andthis strategic position allows Iran to occupy an important place inRussian foreign policy. Apparently, Russia played a major role inIran’s pursuit of an effective foreign policy in the last 20 years and is aserious actor in the Middle East.

 

While these developments occurred between Russia and Iran,after 1991, the Caspian Basin occupied an important place for Russiain the policies towards the US. Taking this basin as a starting point, theUS has sought to bring the region’s rich hydrocarbon resources toworld markets and to secure Europe’s energy security, while on theother side to open a gap between Russia and Iran for a corridor to CentralAsia. In addition, it is also true that the US, which did not want toundermine much of Russia due to its nuclear power, could not preventRussia from re-emerging as a serious power at the beginning of the2000s. In other words, the US’s mistakes in Post-Soviet space resultedin the empowerment of Russia and created an environment for thefurther strengthening of Iran-Russia relations, thus strengthening theposition of Iran. Moreover, the US’s hesitant and, being more precisely, erroneous foreign policy implementations in this process have influencedIran’s reinforcement of its regional leadership role.

 

It is assessed that the influence of the Islamic revolution is great intransformation of Iran into regional power. But the main source of thistransformation is not rich state tradition and culture or military andeconomic power of Iran, but rather its flexible foreign policy exercise, thetheocratic political structure, its sectarian-based ideological model, and theregional opportunities after the Cold War. The theocratic politicalstructure of Iran and its current ideology has ensured a protection fromexternal factors while allowing new dynamics to open up the gates ofneighboring states and to influence them. In this context, the disintegrationof the Soviet Union, the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, theArab Spring as a chaos of the Middle East, and attitudes of the West andIsrael in fueling the sectarian conflicts in the Middle East can beunderlined as factors increasing the power of Iran in the region.

 

Bibliography

 

Books

ALİYARLI, Süleyman, Azerbaycan Tarihi, Çırak Yayınları, Bakü, 2009.

BUZAN, Barry ve Wæver Ole, Regions and Powers.The structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 2003.

CLARK, Wesley, Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire, Public Affairs, New York, 2003.

FRIEDMAN, George, Gelecek 100 Yıl, Pegasus Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009.

KARAMI, Jahangir, Russia and Iran Relations, Political and International Studies Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, 2009.

MEVAYE-YE JOMHURİ-YE İSLAMİ-YE İRAN der siyaset-e harici.

Mevaze-ye Cahani. Osul ve mavazeyi siyaset-I harice, s. 612-631. Mecelle-ye siyaset-e harici, 1375, yay N2 (Beyanatlar, 21 dekabr, 1995-21 Mart 1996.

MUTLU, Kayhan, Orta Doğu Raporu, Turgut Özal Üniversitesi Yayınları, Ankara, 2012.

ORTAYLI, İlber, Türklerin Tarihi, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul 2015.

ROUX, J. Paul, Türklerin Tarihi-Pasifik’ten Akdeniz’e 2000 Yıl, Çev.

Aykut Kazancıgil ve Lale Arslan-Özcan, Kabalcı Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2008.

 

Articles and Book Chapters

ARAS, Bülent, “İran’ın Değişen Güvenlik Dengesi Çerçevesinde Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Cumhuriyetleri ile İlişkileri”, Avrasya Dosyası, No 3, 1996.

BLANK, Stephen, J., “Russia’s Return to Mideast Diplomacy”, Orbis, Volume 40, Issue 4, 1996.

İBRAHİMLİ, Haleddin, “İran; Belgelerde ve Gerçeklikte”, Yeni Türkiye Orta Doğu Özel Sayısı, Ocak-Haziran 2016, Sayı 85.

İBRAHİMLİ, Haleddin, “Rusya-İran: Ortaklar ve Rakipler.”, Yeni Türkiye Orta Doğu Özel Sayısı, Ocak-Haziran 2016, Sayı 87.

EFEGİL, Ertan, “İran’ın Dış Politika Yapım Sürecini Etkileyen Unsurlar”, Orta Doğu Analiz, Aralık 2012, Cilt 4, Sayı 48.

TEHMASIB, Shirin, “Iran, Russia, and the Southern Republics of the USSR,” Discuss on the Seasonal Publication, 1996, No 12, pp. 57-71.

 

Theses

YURDAKURBAN, İsmail, Devrim Sonrası İran Dış Politikası, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Selçuk Üniversitesi, SBE, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, Konya.

 

Newspapers

“ABD Orta Doğu’da tamamen etkisizleşti”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 24 Kasım 2017.

 

Internet Resources

ABD Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Kasım 2007 Raporu, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/20071203_release.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 06.08.2018).

ÇİTLİOĞLU Ercan, İran’ı Anlamak, Başkent Üniversitesi, 2015, http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/makaleler/iranianlamak.pdf (Erişim Tarihi:06.08.2018)

ÇEVİKÖZ, Ünal, “İran ile Konuşarak Anlaşmanın Yolu Yok Mudur?”, Hürriyet Gazetesi, 13 Kasım 2017,http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/unal-cevikoz/iran-ile-konusarak-anlasmanin-yolu-yok-mudur-40642959  (Erişim Tarihi: 11 Ocak 2017).

DOSTER, Barış, “Bir Bölgesel Güç Olarak İran’ın Orta Doğu Politikası”, Orta Doğu Analiz, Ağustos 2012, Cilt 4, Sayı 44 http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/44/4barisdoster.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 06.08.2018).

“İRAN ANAYASASI”, İmam Humeyni İnternet Sayfası, http://www.imam khomeini.com/web1/turkish/showitem.aspx?cid=1736&h=22&f=23&pid=2048 (Erişim Tarihi:08.01.2018).

İVANOVNA, Anastasiya ve AleksandraMusatkina, “Poseyat Razdorna Zapade: Mey Obvinila Rossiyu v Podrıve Mejdunarodnoy Sistemı Poryadka”, https://russian.rt.com/world/article/449290-tereza-mei-obvinenia-rossiya (Erişim Tarihi: 12 Ocak 2018).

KEMP, Dj. & R. Kharkavi, “Strategic Geography, and Changing the Middle East (1997)”, http://en.berlogamisha.mybb.ru/viewtopic.php?id=59&p=9 (Erişim Tarihi: 10 Ocak 2018).

KISSINGER, Henry, Kakspasti Blijnıy Vostokotkollapsa, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Kak-spasti-Blizhnii-Vostok-ot-kollapsa-17767 (Erişim Tarihi: 03.08.2018).

KÖSE, Talha, “İran Nükleer Programı ve Orta Doğu Siyaseti: Güç Dengeleri ve Diplomasinin İmkanları”. SETA Yayınları III, Ağustos 2008, http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/iran-nukleer-programi-ve-orta-dogu-siyaseti-guc-dengeleri-ve-diplomasinin-imkanlari.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 06.08.2018).

PETERS, Ralph, “Blood Brothers, How a Better Middle East Would Work”, http://brilliantmaps.com/new-middle-east, http://armedforcesjournal.com/blood-borders (Erişim Tarihi: 10 Ocak 2018).

PİRİNÇÇİ, Ferhat, “Arap Baharını Yeniden Düşünmek”, ORSAM, Kasım-Aralık, Sayı 65, http://www.ferhatpirincci.com/download/orsam_ferhatpirincci.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 10 Ocak 2018).

RICE, Condoleezza, “Plans for Redrawing the Middle East: The Project for a New Middle East”, https://www.globalresearch.ca/plans-for-redrawing-the-middle-east-the-project-for-a new-middle-east/3882, (Erişim Tarihi: 10 Ocak 2018).

SARIKAYA, Yalçın, “Geçmişten Günümüze İran: Tarih, Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür”. Türk Akademisi Dış Politika Araştırmaları Merkezi Raporu No. 2, Kasım 2012, http://www.tasav.org/media/k2/attachments/dpa_rapor_2_gecmisten_gunumuze_Iran_sarikaya_son.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 06.08.2018).

SATURYAN, Sarkis, “NATO Tolkaet Saudovskuyu Araviyu Na Aqressuyu Protiv Rossii i Sirii”, 26 Ekim 2017, https://regnum.ru/news/2326474.html (Erişim Tarihi: 13 Kasım 2017).

TARASOV, Stanislav, “Stanet li Irakskiy Kurdistan Nezavisimim Qosudarstvom?” 26 Eylül 2017, https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2326749.html/ (Erişim Tarihi: 10 Kasım 2017).

WESTERMAYR Josef, “Realpolitik in Iran: Opportunities and Challenges.”Politikon: IAPSS Journal of Political Science, 138–161. https://www.iapss.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/138_pdfsam_Politikon-Volume-28-December-2015.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 06.082018);

YEĞİN, Abdullah, “İran’ın Sert Gücü”, Analiz, Şubat 2016, Sayı: 150, http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20160215153935_iranin-sert-gucu-pdf.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 06.08.2018).

YINON, Oded, “A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/The%20Zionist%20Plan%20for%20the%20Middle%20East.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 10 Ocak 2018)