ISIS IN TÜRKİYE: A WEAKENED ACTOR BUT A CONTINUING SECURITY RISK

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became a global security threat in 2014 after declaring a so-called “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. Because of its geographical location, long border with Syria, and direct connection to the Syrian civil war, Türkiye became one of the countries affected by ISIS activities. Especially between 2015 and 2017, large scale attacks in Türkiye clearly showed that ISIS was a serious threat to internal security. Today, although ISIS is less visible in Türkiye, it cannot be said that the organization has completely disappeared.

ISIS’s structure in Türkiye is not centralized or hierarchical. Instead, it is based on small cells and hidden networks. This structure helped the organization survive under strong security pressure and made it harder to detect. These cells usually continued their activities through family ties, informal religious meetings, and digital propaganda channels. Türkiye was also used as a transit route by the organization in the past, which allowed these networks to become more local over time. As a result, Türkiye became not only a transit country but also a place where ISIS could continue its organizational activities.

The most violent period of ISIS in Türkiye was between 2015 and 2017. The Suruç, Ankara Train Station, Atatürk Airport, and Reina nightclub attacks were important not only because of the high number of deaths, but also because they created deep social trauma and fear. These attacks clearly showed that ISIS directly targeted civilians. After Türkiye launched the Euphrates Shield Operation against ISIS in Syria, the organization’s rhetoric towards Türkiye became harsher, and Türkiye was openly defined as a target.

After 2017, ISIS lost most of its territorial control in Iraq and Syria, which directly reduced its attack capacity in Türkiye. In 2019, the loss of its last territory in Syria and the killing of its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created both a military and symbolic break for the organization. After these events, ISIS changed its strategy. Instead of large and loud attacks, it focused on low profile and long term activities. Protecting financial networks, recruiting new members, and continuing propaganda became the main elements of this new period.

In this context, the attack on the Santa Maria Church in Sarıyer, Istanbul on 28 January 2024 is especially important. This attack, claimed by ISIS after a long time, showed that the organization was not completely inactive in Türkiye. In its statement after the attack, ISIS used the term “Türkiye Province.” This was seen as a symbolic message showing that the organization wanted to present Türkiye again as an operation area. This message focused more on psychological impact and presence than on real capacity.

The intensive operations against ISIS in Türkiye in 2024 and 2025 show that state pressure on the organization has increased. Hundreds of suspects were detained, operations were carried out in many cities at the same time, and financial networks were targeted. These actions significantly limited ISIS’s freedom of movement in Türkiye. However, connections with ISIS-Khorasan linked structures show that the organization has not fully cut its ties with international networks.

In conclusion, ISIS no longer has the capacity to carry out large scale and high profile attacks in Türkiye like in the past. However, this does not mean that the organization is completely ineffective. Today, ISIS continues to exist in Türkiye through cell based structures, financial support networks, and ideological continuity. Therefore, even though it is militarily weakened, ISIS remains a security risk that must be carefully monitored by security and intelligence authorities.

References:

https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cz7n71yp0lzo