The Reform Issue of the United Nations Security Council

The establishment of nation-states and the development of international law laid the foundation for international organizations that provide the necessary framework for resolving conflicts through diplomacy and have become among the most significant actors in the contemporary international system. Although the United Nations (UN) was legally established, over time, particularly due to the totalitarian structure of the Security Council (UNSC), the victorious states that constitute the UN have acquired privileged positions, which they continue to maintain today. The founding states holding permanent seats and veto power in the UNSC are able to safeguard their interests within the international system and, through this, influence both regional and global policies.

The term “veto” is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter. However, Article 27 of the Charter states that “decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Decisions on substantive matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” This provision clearly distinguishes between procedural and substantive matters in the voting system. It is evident that, in the case of an important issue on which the majority of the Security Council agrees, a single negative vote from a permanent member can prevent a decision from being adopted. The requirement for unanimity among permanent members effectively grants five states the power of veto.

The debate over permanent membership and veto power in the Security Council highlights that the permanent members originally selected controlled the largest territories and populations in the world at the time. This historical context constitutes one of the key aspects of contemporary reform discussions. Despite the dynamic nature of global power relations, it is evident that the current permanent members do not reflect these changes in the balance of power. While the United Kingdom and France have experienced a decline in influence, economically strong and stable states such as Germany and Japan—ranking second and third in financial contributions to the UN—remain excluded from permanent membership. The structure of the organization, which granted privileges to major powers and was partially justified in the context of its founding period, has over time become a target of criticism due to the emergence of new states and, particularly, the appearance of new power centers following the Cold War. In this context, numerous voices have called for the organization to adapt to contemporary conditions, and various reform proposals have been put forward. Nevertheless, significant resistance exists from those seeking to preserve the status quo and oppose such restructuring. Considering the numerous conflicts of interest and deadlocks that shape current international politics, it can be argued that the UN faces a significant challenge.

The only exception to the UN’s generally non-binding decision-making authority is the United Nations Security Council, which is mandated to maintain international peace and security. The Council possesses the authority to adopt binding decisions that all states, whether members of the organization or not, are obliged to comply with. As an institution in which not all UN members are represented, the Security Council remains the most effective organ within the UN system, whose decisions carry obligatory force. Its binding authority is grounded in the United Nations Charter, which empowers the Council to make decisions on behalf of all member states.

It has been observed that Security Council members frequently exercise their votes on behalf of their own states with political considerations that prioritize national interests over the needs of the international system. Members are under no obligation to justify their voting rationale. Permanent members, rather than working efficiently or seeking solution-oriented outcomes, often use their votes as instruments to pursue geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives. No mechanism has been established to prevent permanent members with veto power from unilaterally paralyzing the system. This situation, particularly regarding the veto, applies to all decisions the Council may adopt or fail to adopt. The Council is not held accountable for its actions, and despite holding extensive authority, it is neither required to operate transparently nor is there a mechanism to monitor its decisions or inaction.

Article 27 of the UN Charter stipulates that each member has one vote (paragraph 1) and that decisions on procedural matters require the affirmative vote of nine members (paragraph 2). These provisions establish a democratic procedure for procedural decisions. However, paragraph 3 of the same article specifies that decisions on substantive matters—which in practice constitute the veto power—require the affirmative votes of nine members, including all permanent members. A close reading of the article shows that the Charter does not explicitly confer a veto right; rather, its existence is implicit. The absence, non-participation, or abstention of any of the five permanent members serves to soften the application of the veto. The article does not clarify whether such de facto situations qualify as a veto.

During the Korean War in 1950, the Security Council faced difficulties in decision-making when the USSR boycotted meetings to protest the membership of the Republic of China (Taiwan) instead of the People’s Republic of China. The Council nonetheless adopted Resolution 83 on 27 June 1950, authorizing UN forces to support South Korea against North Korea. The USSR ended its six-month protest and returned to meetings following Resolution 87, subsequently exercising its veto in several Korean-related decisions. The General Assembly, emphasizing the Council’s failure to fully ensure international peace and security, adopted the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution 377(V) on 3 November 1950, allowing the Assembly to act when the Council fails in its primary mandate. To counteract the USSR’s deliberate system blockade, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 498(V) on 1 February 1951. The resolution cited North Korea’s armed attacks on South Korea and the support of the People’s Republic of China, which had impeded the Security Council’s functioning through veto, calling on member states to place their military forces under UN command. Subsequently, Resolution 500(V) of 18 May 1951 recommended the imposition of an embargo, also declared by the General Assembly.

The inability of permanent members to exercise veto through abstention or non-participation is intended to facilitate decision-making. The UN Secretary-General determines whether an issue is substantive or procedural; if the Secretary-General declines this responsibility, a vote including all Council members is held. Any negative vote by a permanent member is then interpreted as indicating a substantive matter. In other words, the determination of whether a question is “substantive or procedural” is treated as a substantive issue itself. This practice further consolidates the already strong position of permanent members. In doctrinal literature, this is referred to as the “double veto” mechanism.

Reform demands regarding the Security Council fundamentally stem from the inequitable composition of its membership, its limited representational capacity, and a broader legitimacy crisis. The Council, established within the power dynamics of its founding context, proves inadequate in addressing the political realities of the contemporary international system. Its structure, which was created based on the victors and vanquished of World War II, does not reflect the current distribution of power within the global system. An organization with self-appointed and unchangeable permanent members, each capable of vetoing any decision, cannot be considered to possess a democratic structure, nor can it be expected to act impartially. In a world where alternative governance models are gradually disappearing in favor of democratic systems, such anti-democratic mechanisms are likely to destabilize the global balance. An organization with self-appointed and unchangeable permanent memberships and members who can veto any decision they want cannot be claimed to have a democratic structure, nor can it be expected to be impartial. In today’s world where alternative governance models are disappearing one by one in the face of democracy, it is clear that such an anti-democratic pressure will shake the global balance.

Despite all criticisms directed at the Security Council, no significant progress has been made to address these issues. The structural problems of the Council persist. Reform efforts face substantial obstacles, primarily because they would require overcoming the veto privileges granted to powerful permanent members. The veto right constitutes a strategic advantage for these states, enabling them to exert considerable influence over global politics under the UN framework. Consequently, states possessing veto power are reluctant to share this advantage with competing actors.

An additional challenge concerns the criteria for determining which states should be admitted if the Council is to be expanded. It remains unclear whether new members should be selected based on economic or military capabilities, or on demographic predominance. Given that the current international landscape differs significantly from that of the UN’s founding years, determining Council membership is particularly complex. This complexity is further exacerbated by the competition among states seeking representation within the Council.

The United Nations was established not to impose its authority on states within the international system but rather to serve the needs of states. From this perspective, the UN does not function as a supranational authority independent of its member states; rather, it operates as an actor whose capacity to act is heavily dependent on them. The UN, particularly in terms of securing financial resources, remains under the influence of Europe and, predominantly, the United States. The use of this influence by these states within the Security Council to advance their own interests or safeguard their survival reflects the dynamics of the current international system. Therefore, the failure of Security Council reform efforts can be understood as a direct outcome of existing power relations.

Consequently, as the Security Council was perceived to have failed in effectively fulfilling its responsibilities amid changing international power dynamics, its legitimacy began to be increasingly questioned, and reform pressures emerged from various quarters. Although certain steps and proposals for reform have been put forward, none have been implemented, and the Council has been unable to adapt itself in line with contemporary developments and challenges. Representing a critical structure for international security, the Security Council has thus become a highly debated and problematic organ.

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