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Çağ Üniversitesi
03.12.2025

Report on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Melek Tekin tarafından

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been one of the most enduring and violent ethnic struggles in the post-Soviet world. The region, mainly populated by Christian Armenians but located within majority-Muslim Azerbaijan, has been at the center of tensions since the late 1980s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both sides engaged in a bloody campaign of mutual ethnic cleansing. The first war in the early 1990s killed around 30,000 people and forced hundreds of thousands from their homes. In late September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a new and decisive military operation to regain full control over Nagorno-Karabakh. The offensive lasted only 24 hours but completely changed the situation. The president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, Samvel Shahramanyan, signed a decree dissolving all state institutions, declaring that the region would “cease to exist” by 2024. Almost the entire Armenian population of the enclave—about 120,000 people—fled to Armenia. Azerbaijan described its actions as an “anti-terror operation.” The Azerbaijani government justified the attack as a response to the elections held in the separatist enclave on September 9 and 
to recent land-mine explosions that killed six Azerbaijanis, including four police officers. 

 

However, reports indicated that the assault had been planned for a long time, as Armenia accused Azerbaijan of massing troops near the border and around Nagorno-Karabakh days before the attack. The operation was marked by heavy drone strikes, air sirens, and shelling near Stepanakert, the capital of the region. Azerbaijan’s goal was the complete surrender and “reintegration” of the territory. Officials in Baku declared that the Armenian forces should “disarm themselves and raise the white flag.” The government also maintained the blockade of the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, which had been closed since late 2022. This caused extreme shortages of food, medicine, and fuel, leaving the population in severe humanitarian conditions. Although Baku briefly agreed to reopen the corridor, it was too late for most civilians. Western countries responded with standard diplomatic calls for calm but avoided direct intervention. Russia, once the region’s dominant power and a supposed guarantor of peace, remained silent. Its 2,000 peacekeepers, stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh since the 2020 armistice, did nothing to prevent the new war.

Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan accused Moscow of abandoning its ally. Relations between Yerevan and Moscow had already worsened after Armenia refused to hold joint military exercises with Russia. Many analysts believe that Russia allowed Azerbaijan to act freely as a way to punish Armenia and weaken its position. In the early 1990s, around 80% of Armenians saw Russia as a friend, but that number has fallen sharply in recent years. On September 19, 2023, protests broke out in Yerevan with people chanting, “Russia is an enemy.” As the balance of power shifts, the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh marks not only the end of a long-standing separatist entity but also a major turning point for the entire South Caucasus region. 

References 
 
Margalit, M. (2023, October). *The end of Nagorno-Karabakh.* Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org 
 
The Economist. (2023, September 20). *Azerbaijan wants to “reintegrate” Nagorno-Karabakh through force.* *The Economist.* https://www.economist.com 
 

 

Melek Tekin

YAZAR HAKKINDA