The work in question focuses on how violent non-state actors are shaped in global politics and how the United States' attitude towards these structures has changed. It can be said that the US, especially in regions where crises are constantly experienced, such as the Middle East, sometimes adopts an approach that incites conflict rather than peaceful solutions. This situation is explained very clearly with the example of Hamas. It is stated that although Hamas is an armed structure, it also receives strong social support from a certain segment of the Palestinian people and provides social services, meaning that it cannot be considered merely a "terrorist organization". Despite this, the fact that the US has never left a door open to this structure has weakened hopes for peace in the region over time.
The work covers in detail not only the military power of Hamas but also its political and social aspects. The 2006 elections in particular were a critical turning point here. Although Hamas won the elections through democratic means, the US did not recognize this result and, instead of respecting the will of the Palestinian people, adopted a stance that prioritized Israel's security. I think this part is one of the most striking parts of the study because it creates a very serious contradiction for a state that constantly puts forward a value like democracy, to disregard it when it does not suit its interests. In fact, such contradictions are frequently emphasized throughout the study. In particular, the US's relationship with Israel seems to have mostly produced results to the detriment of the Palestinians. In an environment where even attacks on civilians are legitimized, it is a bit difficult to talk about peace.
In the case of GAM, the picture is quite different. This structure, which emerged in the Aceh region of Indonesia, also waged an armed struggle for a while, but later turned to peace, especially after the tsunami disaster. Here, the US adopted a much softer attitude. It did not completely exclude GAM, and even indirectly contributed to the reconciliation process. This shows that how the US will approach a structure is as much about where it is located as what that structure does. An armed structure in the Middle East and a structure in Southeast Asia are not evaluated in the same way. One is seen as a direct threat, while relations can be established with the other under certain conditions. This clearly reveals what is called double standards.
Another thing that caught my attention in the process in Indonesia is that GAM has been able to transform into a political structure over time. There was also support from international actors behind this transformation, but most importantly, the parties sought a solution instead of trying to destroy each other. The constructive attitude of the US here seems to have facilitated the progress of the process. In other words, it is possible to see that it can actually play a more balanced and peaceful role if it wants to. This situation is really thought-provoking when compared to the example of Hamas because both structures have waged an armed struggle, but one was given the chance for dialogue while the other was never given this opportunity.
Throughout the work, issues such as the relationship between non-state actors and society, the support they receive from the public, and the services they provide are also carefully addressed. It is clearly explained that Hamas is not only powerful in terms of its military but also its social aspect. Ignoring this aspect and evaluating the incident solely as an armed conflict also makes peace impossible. The GAM example was able to use an opportunity in this respect. Perhaps if the geography were not so tense, a similar transformation would have been possible for Hamas, but it is understood that the biggest obstacle here is the rigid attitudes of international actors.
One of the parts that made me think the most was this: The US acting as a peace ambassador in one place and almost adding fuel to the fire in another. This is not only a matter of a country's domestic politics, but also of the general order of the world. Because when great powers act only in their own interests, the suffering experienced by local peoples increases. While no communication is ever established with Hamas, the fact that a structure like GAM is given a chance is a good example of this. In other words, the issue is not about "who did more damage", but "how much space is given to whom". And whether or not to open this area is completely in the hands of the great powers.
Towards the end, it is also explained how the US has approached structures such as the FARC, IRA, and KLA in the past. Dialogue has been established with some of them over time, while others have never been recognized. This shows that there is no single template. It is not possible to label anyone as absolutely good or bad. Everything changes according to the conjuncture and interest calculations. At this point, in my opinion, the general message of the work is this: Consistency is very difficult to find in international relations. Especially when it comes to the foreign policy of great powers, there is always a big difference between what they say and what they do.
In short, the analyses in the work do not look at events only from the perspective of security or threat. At the same time, they try to show the reality experienced by peoples and societies. It is clearly shown that laying down arms or turning to peace is not only an internal decision, but also very much related to the approach of the outside world. Space is opened to some, while walls are built against others. These differences are one of the most important factors determining the fate of conflicts.